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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1955, six European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands) united by signing the Treaty of Rome' in order to restore Europe's physical
and economic prowess.2 The signing of the Treaty of Rome created the European Economic

1. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. In 1973, the group of Member States was enlarged to include Denmark, Ireland,

and the United Kingdom. Gordon Slynn, Aspects of the Law of the European Economic Community, 18
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1 (1985). In 1981, Greece became a member, and in June 1986 Spain and Portugal joined
membership. Id.

2.

Slynn supra note 1,at 1-2.
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Community which had as its primary objective the promoting of a common market enjoying
the freedoms of the movement of goods and capital typical of a national system?
The European Court of Justice (ECJ)4 has overseen a colorful history of protecting the

integrity of the European common market. Playing an important role in this history is the
European Commission,5 which has the duty of detecting and preventing market violations
as defined by articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome.6 The nature and extent of the

Commission's investigating and information collecting powers7 has been a controversial

issue, and the subject of much litigation in the European Community.8 Nevertheless, the
ECJ has consistently interpreted the powers under article 14 broadly so as to give due effect
to the purpose and scheme of regulation 17.

3. WnijAM ALEXANIER, THE EEC Ruins oF CoMN'wmoN I (1979). "One of the fundamental
objectives of the [Treaty of Rome] is the establishment of a Common Market within which goods ... may
circulate as freely as within a national market.- Id
4. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 174 (defming the role of the ECJ). The ECI has exclusive
authority to interpret the Treaty of Rome and may review and invalidate findings and acts of the European
Commission. Id See generally L NEviu=s BROWN, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
1-12 (3d ed. 1989) (discussing the importance of the role of the ECJ in interpreting and applying the Treaty of
Rome). See also 1 D.G. VALENTINE, THE COURT OF JUSTIE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrIES 268-70, 362-63,
422-25 (1965) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the ECJ and its role within the European Community).
5.
See Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 167(1). The members of the Commission are chosen by joint
agreement between the governments of the Member States. Id They are expected to be totally independent of
their respective governments and they may not be relieved of their positions, nor hold any other positions. Id.
art. 158. The Commission is given the responsibility of bringing before the ECJ any undertaking (business) that
fails to comply with the provisions of the EEC. kId art. 157. The concept of an undertaking is subject to varying
interpretations, see infra note 155 and accompanying text (providing a brief overview on the scope of the term
undertaking). A detailed review of this concept is beyond the scope of this Casenote.
6. 1Id arts. 85-86. Article 85 provides in part:
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may
affect trade betweea Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in particular those which: (a)
directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; (b) limit or control
production, markets, technical development, or investment; [or] (c) share markets or sources of supply
I. art. 85. Article 86 provides in part: "Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within
the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market
in so far as it may affect trade between Member States..." I. art. 86.
7.
Id art. 14. Article 14 of regulation 17 of the Treaty of Rome provides that when the Commission
is suspicious of anti-competitive practices it may conduct an investigation: (a) to examine books and business
records; (b) to take copies; (c) to ask for immediate oral explanations; and (d) to enter any land, premises or
methods of transportation of such undertakings. Id
8.
Chantal Lavoie, The Investigative Powersof the Commission with Respect to Business Secrets under
Community Competition Rules, 17 EUR. L. REv. 20, 21 (1992). Some have criticized this power of the
Commission by arguing that the powers combine the role of investigator, prosecutor and judge. Id See Debates
of the European Parliament, No. 1-253 March 1980, at 34. Among the critics of the Commission's expansive
investigatory powers are the Union of Industries of the European Community (UNICE), International Chamber
of Commerce (ICC), and the Consultative Committee of Bar Associations of the European Community (CCBE).
1Id But see, Helmut W. Kreis, EEC Commission InvestigationProceduresin Competition Cases, 17 INT'L L. 19,
20 (1983) (countering critcism of the Commission's broad power by emphasizing the fairness and accuracy of
its investigative process).
9. The purpose of the Commission's powers is outlined in the preamble to regulation 17 which provides
that "[I]n order to secure uniform application of Articles 85 and 86 in the common market, rules must be made
under which the Commission ... must have the cooperation of the competent national authorities of the Member
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Recently the ECI re-examined the Commission's investigation procedure in HoechstA G
v. Commission,10 announcing a novel view on Commission powers and the fundamental
right of privacy of Community-based undertakings. The Hoechstdecisionimpacts both the
practitioner or business person with interests in European undertakings, and the Community
perception of the application of privacy rights to businesses.
Part II of this note briefly discusses landmark decisions of the ECJ that have affected
the Commission's power to investigate businesses suspected of violating Treaty of Rome
competition law." Part HI sets out the Hoechst case and offers an analysis of the ECJ's
decision.' 2 Part IV is a look at the Advocate General's view of the same case." Part V
discusses the impact of the Hoechst opinion on the Commission's investigation power, and
Community notions of the fundamental right of privacy.'4 Part VI concludes this note with
some anticipated and recommended reactions to the Hoechst decision. 5
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.

Surprise Investigationsby the Commission

It is the hope of the Commission, indeed it is the design of its powers under regulation
17, that investigations be conducted in the spirit of mutual cooperation.1 6 While most
businesses under investigation comply with the Commission's requests for information, more
and more businesses are refusing to give the Commission access to their information, thereby
questioning the Commission's power of investigation."7 The Commission is given
extensive discovery power under regulation 17.18
A relatively recent acknowledgment of the Commission's investigating powers is its
ability to order an inspection of business premises without providing prior notice to the firm.
Such surprise investigations were upheld by the ECJ in NationalPanasonic(UK) Lt2 v.
Commission.19 In Panasonic,the undertaking argued that the Commission's surprise visit
infringed upon its fundamental rights, most notably its right of notice and opportunity to be
heard.2" The Commission responded that fundamental rights under the European

States and be empowered, throughout the common market, to require such information to be supplied and to
undertake such investigations as are necessary to bring to light any agreement, decision or concerted practice
prohibited by [Articles 85 and 86]." Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, reg. 17.
10. Joined cases 46/87 & 227/88, 1989 E.C.R. 2859, 4 C.M.L.R. 410 (1991).
11. See infra notes 16-57 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 58-105 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 106-27 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 128-58 and accompanying text.
15.

See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.

16.

Lavoie, supra note 8, at 20.

17.

See, Julian Mathic Joshua, The Element of Surprise: EEC CompetitionInvestigations underArticle

14(3) of Regulation 17, 8 EUR. L REV. 3, 3-4 (1983) (arguing that since this type of simple authorization has
no obligatory effect on the commercial undertaking, it is naive to suppose that companies with something to hide
will forego the chances offered by the procedure to deny access to the incriminating information).
18. See Lavoie, supra note 8, at 21 (justifying the reach of these investigations under a public interest
analysis, since the public is served by diligent enforcement of competition rules).
19. Case 136/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2033, 3 C.M.LR. 169 (1980) (upholding the Commission's power to
conduct surprise investigations of undertakings suspected of violating articles 85 and 86, but extending a
fundamental right of privacy to business premises).
20. Id. at 2056-57, para. 17.
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Convention "may be interfered with to the extent it is in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well being of the country ... or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.""1 For that reason, and to give due effect to the function of the Commission's
investigatory power,, Panasonic's argument was rejected.2
While Panasonic, as the undertaking, argued that such unannounced visits are
unnecessarily intrusive of business activities, the notion that the element of surprise is
essential for the successful application of EEC competition law prevailed.'
Panasonicmarked the reversal of the 1976 Bar and Law Society Joint Working Party
recommendation of providing adequate notice to businesses before the investigation.24
While the applicant in Panasonicsought to limit the Commission's use of surprise
investigations to circumstances of extreme gravity, the result resounded with the notion that
surprise is essential where the possibility exists that the business concerned will attempt to
frustrate the purpose of the inquiry by removing or destroying incriminating records. 5
While the ECI recognized an extension of the right of privacy in the home, to the business
premise, it nevertheless found that the surprise procedures did not infringe upon those
rights.26 The extension of this privacy was seemingly premised on the European
Convention of Human Rights.27
There were several factors that led up to the Panasonicdecision, including increased
resistance by undertakings and their advisors to investigations.2 8 The ease with which
incriminating evidence may be concealed, along with the inadequacies of some of the
Commission's past fact-findings, were also considerations of the ECI in reaching its
decision.29
By refusing to confine the Commission's power to order surprise investigations to
exceptional circumstances, the ECJ in Panasonicadded an important weapon to the
Commission's arsenal of investigatory powers. Nevertheless, the vast majority of
investigations are still carried out by appointment, thereby giving adequate notice to the
31
undertaking. 30 Under article 14, the Commission has discretion to proceed by surprise.
The ECI in Panasonicheld that the Commission need not begin its investigations by
requesting information, but rather may immediately exercise its full investigatory powers
under article 14, thereby refusing to require the Commission to pursue the least intrusive
32
means.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id at 2057, para. 19.
Id at 2058-59, para. 23.
Id. at 2060, pa-a. 29.
Joshua, supra note 17, at 3.
Kreis, supra note 8, at 46.
Panasonic,1980 E.C.R. at 2045.

27.

Id

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Joshua, supra note 17, at 4-5.
Id at 5-6.
Id
Panasonic,1950 E.C.R. at 2055, para. 12.
Id at 2056, pans. 15-16.
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B. Protectionof Lawyer-Client Communications in Commission Proceedings
In AM&S Europe Ltd v. Commission,3 the ECI addressed perhaps the most debated
issue surrounding the Commission's powers.34 In AM&S, the ECJ decided to extend
protection under the EEC law to lawyer-clietht communications.35 Not only does the
recognized privilege inAM&S cover all written communications with a lawyer exchanged
after the initiation of a Commission procedure, but it also encompasses communications
between a client and a class of independent EEC lawyers before any proceeding by the
Commission.36 However, since the lawyers must be entitled to practice before the courts
of a Member State, U.S. attorneys in Europe are not included in the coverage. 31 While this
rule of confidentiality came from English law, an adversarial system, its present Community
application is to Commission proceedings, an information gathering device. 38 This
incongruity has led some to suggest that where the exercise of the privilege leads to the
frustration of the Commission's investigations, it should not be recognized.39
In AM&S, the ECI decided that it was for the Commission, and not the undertaking or
a third party, to decide whether a particular document had to be produced.4" Therefore, it
is the undertaking's burden to prove to the investigator's satisfaction that the requested
evidence is confidential. If the undertaking fails to convince the Commission that the
undertaking is not bound to disclose a particular item of information, then it is for the ECJ
to determine whether disclosure is required."
C. Protectionof Business Secrets in Commission Proceedings
In AKZO Chemie BVv. Commission4 2 the ECI considered an issue similar to the one
encountered in the AM&S case. InAKZO, the Commission conveyed documents received
by the applicant (AKZO) to the complainant (ECS).4 3 AKZO alleged that the Commission
breached its duty of confidentiality by disclosing the documents which should have been
protected as business secrets. 44 The Commission's primary defense was that the

33. Case 155/79, 1982 E.C.R. 1575,2 C.M.L.R. 264 (1982) (recognizing a protection of attorney-client
communications during the investigation of an undertaking suspected of conduct violating Community
competition rules).
34. J.M. Joshua, Information in EEC CompetitionProcedures, 11 EuR. L. Ray. 409,423 (1986) (noting
that the issues raised in AM&S regarding protection of attomey-client communications have opened a veritable
Pandora's Box).
35. AM&S, 1982 E.C.R. at 1590, para. 14.
36. 1l In this sense the protections afforded these confidential communications is broader than that under
the American work product privilege. Joshua, supra note 34, at 423. The policy for this rule is obviously to
promote candor in legal counseling. Ua. at 424.
37. Joshua, supra note 34, at 423.
38.
lt at 425.
39. 1l
40.
dL
41. AM&S, 1982 E.C.R. at 1591, para. 16.
42. Case 53/85, 1986 E.C.R. 1965, 1 C.M.L.R. 231 (1986) (involving the Commission's disclosure of
documents that allegedly contained business secrets). The Commission published material it seized during an
investigation of alleged violations of Community competition law by a chemical undertaking. Id. at 1988, para.
11.
43.
l
44.
L at 1989, para. 24.

The TransnationalLawyer/ Vol. 6
investigation was only at an interlocutory stage in the procedure and that therefore the
decision ordering the investigation was not yet susceptible to an appeal to the ECJ.4
However, the ECJnever reached the issue of whether the information disclosed was indeed
a secret, or whether it was adequately safeguarded by the Commission."' Rather, the ECJ
resolved the issue on the ground that the Commission did not give applicant AKZO sufficient
opportunity to appeal the Commission's decision to publish the alleged business secrets."'
At least one commentator fears that AKZO creates just another avenue for noncomplying undertakings to delay the already protracted investigative proceedings. 48 This
concern seems to have its roots in the notion that allowing an interim appeal encourages
unmeritorious claims by an undertaking.49 Undertakings may appeal the Commission's
decision to disclose documents to a complainant solely to prolong its opportunity to hide
incriminating evidence." While this may create another loophole for evasive undertakings,
another commentator has claimed that the ECJ's regulations of business secrets, as
enunciated in AKZO, are an adequate compromise between the competing interests of
business privacy and competition law enforcement.
Just what entails a business secret is still far from settled, it is in any event for the
Commission to decide. 2 While the Commission may investigate these secret materials,
according to AKZO, the undertaking is sufficiently safeguarded by the Commission's
protections against public disclosure of the material. 3
AKZO in effect bifurcated the standard of protection the Commission is to afford
business secrets in publication of their findings5 4 The opinion of Advocate General Lenz
stated that alleged secrets containing proof of suspected competition violations are protected
throughout formal proceedings since no decision has yet been reached on the violation. 5
However, the publication of a business secret is at least possible where it constitutes
evidence of an infringement as determined by the Commission. 6
The tension between business rights and the Commission's Community mandate is
readily apparent from even these few cases. While the European Court has extended some

45.
46.

Xd.at 1989, paa. 14.
Id. at 1993, pama. 31.

47.

IM.

48.

Joshua, supra note 34, at 422.

49.

Id.

50.

Id. This may be a very effective tactic for delay. Id. An appeal may be lodged any time within two

months after the decision is rendered. Id. Additionally, it may take a year or longer for the ECJ to hear the
matter. Id.
51. See Lavoie, supra note 8, at 40, (arguing that the current treatment of business secrets strikes an
appropriate balance in bringing to fight infringements of competition law policy while protecting fundamental

rights inthe process).
52. AKZO, 1986 E.C.R. at 1992, para. 29.
53. Id. para. 28. See Lavoie, supra note 8, at 39 (suggesting that the current balance is appropriate, and
that stricter limitations would significantly impair the Commission's ability to enforce competition law).
54. Lavoie, supra note 8, at 38-39.
55. AKZO, 1986 E.C.R. at 1992, para. 28.
56. See id (holding that the legitimate interest in protecting the business secret may be lost once the
Community has made its decision and found competition rules have effectively been violated).
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vital concessions to shield undertakings under investigation, it has been at least equally
generous in its arming of the Commission.57
Im. THE CASE
A.

The Facts

Hoechst AG, a German company involved in the chemical industry, produces and
markets PVC and polyethylene.55 The Commission suspected that industry of involvement
in price fixing and delivery quotas in violation of Community articles 85 and 86.59 The
Commission decided to conduct an investigation of Hoechst. On January 20, 1987
Commission officials appeared unannounced on the Hoechst business premises.' They
were accompanied by a representative of the Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office), the
German authority competent in competition matters.61 The Hoechst representative refused
to submit to the investigation in the absence of a prior judicial warrant.62
Two days later, the Commission made a second attempt, again accompanied by a
member of the Bundeskartellamt, but was again denied access.63 After a third such failure,
the Commission notified Hoechst that it would be subject to a penalty of 1,000 EC unit,
(ECUs)" for each day it refused to consent
to the investigation. On February 3, 1987, it
65
began imposing the penalty on Hoechst.
The Amtsgericht Frankfurt (local court) denied the Bundeskartellamt's application for
a search warrant for the Hoechst premises stating that there were no facts to justify the
suspicion that Hoechst violated EEC competition regulations." On March 26, 1987, the
ECI denied Hoechst's application for interim relief suspending the operation of the
investigation decision and penalty.67 Five days later, the Bundeskartellamt obtained from
the Amtsgericht Frankfurt a search warrant issued directly in the name of the
Commission." On the Commission's next attempt the Hoechst representative submitted

57. See Frances Graupner, The Investigatory Powers of the European Commission in Anti-Trust cases,
16 INT'L Bus. L 93,93 (1988) (noting the Commission's increased vigor and resourcefulness when investigating
alleged competition infringements).
58. Joined cases 46/87 & 227/88, Hoechst AG v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 2859,2863,4 C.M.L.R. 410
(1991) (Hearing Rep.).
59. Id.
60. Id
61. Id
62. Id.
63. Hoechst, 1989 E.C.R. at 2864 (Hearing Rep.).
64. Id. One ECU represents the value of 0.88867088 grams of fine gold.
65. Hoechst, 1989 E.C.R. at 2864 (Hearing Rep.). The penalty was finally fixed at 55,000 ECUs. Id. at
2876, para. 5 (Adv. Gen. Op.). The fines levied on the 15 petrochemical producers in Inre Polypropylene Cartel,
1986 OJ. (L 230) 1, 4 C.M.LR. 347 (1986), totalled $ 58 million U.S. dollars. Julian Mathic Joshua, Proofin
Contested EEC Competition Cases:A Comparisonwith the Rules of Evidence in Common Law, 12 EUR.L. REV.
315, 315 n.3 (1987). -The highest individualized fine was $11 million." Id. It has been suggested that 1,000
ECUs per day is a trifling sum for a company the size of Hoechst. Josephine Shaw, Commission Investigation
ProceduresProtecte4 12 EUR.L. REV. 457, 460 (1987).
66. Hoechst, 1989 E.C.R. at 2864 (Hearing Rep.).
67. Id.
68. Id,
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to the procedure because of the Commission's search warrant.69 Over the next two days
the Commission proceeded with its investigation."
B. ProceduralAspects
Hoechst brought actions under EEC article 173 to have the ECJ declare void the
71
Commission's decisions to conduct an investigation and to penalize the undertaldng. EEC
article 173 provides in part that "the Court of Justice shall determine upon the legality of the
acts... of the Commission. [Mt is competent to pronounce upon appeals for incompetence,
violation of a substantial procedural requirement, violation of the present treaty... brought
by a member state, the Council or the Commission. Any other natural or legal person may,
under the same conditions, bring an appeal...
Two days after the action was filed under article 173, Hoechst brought another action
seeking relief by way of a stay of execution. This action was brought under article 185 of
the Treaty of Rome.7' The ECJ joined the two cases.74
According to article 83(2) of the European Court's Rules of Procedure, in order to
obtain such interim relief as prayed for under EEC article 185, Hoechst is required to state
the subject matter of the dispute, the circumstances giving rise to the urgency, and the factual
and legal grounds establishing a prima facie case for the interim measures requested. 75
Urgency, in this context, has consistently been interpreted as placing a burden on the
applicant to show it will suffer serious harm if the interim relief is not awarded.76

69. 14
70. Id.
71. Hoechst, 1989 E.C.R. at 2864 (Hearing Rep.). Hoechst in its article 173 action against the
Commission, alleging a fundamental right infringement. Id. at 2866. The fundamental right Hoechst relied on
was the inviolability of the home. Id. Hoechst argued that this right also applied to business premises. I at
2868. An additional basis for Hoechst's article 173 action was a procedural argument. Id. at 2866 Hoechst's
procedural claim was that the Commission's statement of reasons in support of the attempted investigation was
defective. Id,
72. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 173. Article 173 allows for judicial review by the ECJ of the
Commission's acts. Id. The right of judicial review exists with respect to all decisions affecting an interest of
an undertaking. Id. A successful appeal must be predicated on one of four grounds specified in article 173: (1)
lack of competence; (2) infringement of an essential procedural requirement (e.g. failure to state adequate
reasons); (3) infringement of the Treaty; and (4) misuse of powers. ALEXANDER,supra note 3, at 42.
73. Shaw, supra nc4e 65, at 458. The ECJ has the power to cancel, reduce or increase the fine, upon an
appeal which must be lodged within two months of notification to the plaintiff. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at
42. While there are no explicit suspending powers, under certain circumstances the ECJ may suspend the
contested act. Id at 43.
74. Hoechst, 1989 E.C.R. at 2864 (Hearing Rep.).
75. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1,art. 185.
76. Josephine Shaw, Recent Developments in the Fieldof CompetitionProcedure, 15 EUR. L. REV.326,
329 (1990).
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C. The Opinion
1.

The Commission'sPowerof Search

Hoechst challenged the Commission's authority to carry out this investigation arguing
that such investigation rises to the level of a search, a level of intrusion not provided for
under article 14 or regulation 7 Hoechst argued that if regulation 17 is construed so as
to allow a search then the provision is unlawful as it violates fundamental rights, the
protection of which demand the issuance of a warrant. 8 The Commission contended that
while their investigations may rise to the level of a search as defined by various member
states, the business' interest is sufficiently safeguarded by the administrative avenues
allowing the business to contest the decision ordering the investigation, and applying for
interim relief to the ECI. The Commission suggested that such protections are the functional
equivalent of a warrant, and therefore the undertaking's fundamental rights were not
impinged.79
The ECJ adopted the Commission's argument and responded that article 14 gives the
Commission as much power as necessary to enable it to carry out its duty under the Treaty
of Rome of ensuring that the rules of competition are applied in the Common Market." °
The ECJ admitted that the scope of investigations may be very wide"1 and that the right of
access afforded the Commission implies its power to search for various items of information
which are not already known or which have not been fully identified."'
Hoechst countered that any authorization of a search power to the Commission is
incompatible with fundamental human rights which require that searches be conducted only
on the basis of a prior judicial warrant. 3 While Hoechst relied on rights extending from
the Community-recognized fundamental right of inviolability of the home, the ECJrefused
to extend that protection to an undertaking." The ECJ did not feel compelled to analogize
the privacy interests of a business with that of a home because it found considerable
divergences between the legal systems of the member states in regard to the nature and
degree of protection afforded to business premises against intervention by the public

77. Hoechst, 1989 E.C.R. at 2922, para. 10. There has been considerable discussion as to whether
inspectors have the power of search. Joshua, supra note 17, at 9-10. Under article 14(3) the Commission has
power to access all premises and can examine all business records of the undertaking. aILAt least one
commentator has suggested that because article 14(3) states that an undertaking "shall submit" to a decision
ordering an investigation, that the undertaking has no duty to cooperate with the officials, who must therefore
have the power of search. Id A more widely adopted view is that undertakings have a positive duty to cooperate
in the investigations, and that officials may not proceed against its will as they could with a search warrant. Il
Absent local authority, the Commission is only empowered to compel cooperation through the administration
of a periodic penalty under articles 15(1)(c) and 16(1)(d). Il
78. Hoechst, 1989 E.C.R. at 2922, pan. 10.
79. Id. at para. 11.
80. Ia at 2926, pana. 25.
81. Id. at para. 26.
82.
d at para. 27.
83. Hoechst, 1989 E.C.R. at 2922, par. 10.
84. Id at 2924, para. 17.
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in
authorities. 5 Further, the ECJ saw no need to expand the scope of the right articulated
86
article 8(1) of the *EuropeanConvention of Human Rights beyond its plain meaning.
The ECJ concluded that natural or legal persons must be protected against arbitrary or
disproportionate intervention by the Community, a principle common to all the legal systems
of the Member States.87 The ECJ suggested that an undertaking's privacy interests are
sufficiently safeguarded, even in the absence of a priorjudicial warrant, because of several
characteristics and limitations of the Commission's power. First, the undertakings are able
to assess and limit the scope of the Commission's intrusion, and therefore their duty to
cooperate with the Commission, because of the fundamental requirement that the
Commission specify the subject matter and the purpose of the investigation.88
Second, article 14 of regulation 17 is premised on the notion of voluntary cooperation
between the undertaking and the Commission. The Commission does not have the power
in itself to force or compel an investigation or an entry. Of course, if the business expresses
its opposition under article 14(6), the Commission may retain assistance of the relevant
national authorities in order to compel compliance.89 Yet, the ECI stated that "it is for each
member state to determine the conditions under which the national authorities will afford
assistance to the Commission's officials," 9 thereby ensuring the Commission's respect of
the relevant procedural guarantees prescribed by national law.91
But what the ECJ gives with one hand it seems to take away with the other, since local
authorities are required to render assistance to the Commission when called on to do so.e
Therefore, the local authority may not substitute its own assessment of the need for the
investigation ordered by the Commission. The Commission's decision is only reviewable
by the ECJ. 93 The local authorities are confined to an inquiry as to whether the
Commission's decision to order the investigation is authentic, and whether the intrusion
envisaged is arbitrary or excessive with regard to the subject matter.' The Commission's
mistaken belief, as evidenced by its arguments, that they were entitled to carry out searches
without respect to procedural guarantees provided for under national law, did not
compromise the legality of their actions.9" The ECJ therefore ruled that the Commission
did not exceed its powers.'e

85. Id.
86. 1,4 at para. 113.Article 8(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights states that "[e]veryone has
the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence" Y.B. EuR. CoNv. ON H.R.

art. 8(l).
87.
88.
89.
90.

Hoechs, 1989 E.C.R. at 2924, para. 19.
Id. at 2927, para. 29.
Id at 2927-28, para. 32.
Id at 2928, para. 33.

91.

Id

92. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 14(6). Article 14(6) provides that where an undertaking opposes
an investigation ordered pursuant to this article, the Member State concerned shall afford the necessary assistance
to the officials authorized by the Commission to enable them to make their investigation. Id.
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2.

The Statement of Reasons Requirement

Hoechst's next argument was that the decision ordering the investigation was invalid
because the Commission's statement of reasons for the9search
was too imprecise, in regard
7
to the subject matter and purpose of the investigation.
While recognizing that the statement ofreasons used in the Commission's decision was
drawn up in very general terms, the ECJ nevertheless upheld the statement because it
contained the essential criteria of article 14(3). 98 Under that article, the statement of
reasons requirement may be satisfied by relatively imprecise wording. It is not necessary
to define the relevant market where the illegal activity took place, give a precise legal
description of the complained of acts, or indicate the period during which those acts are said
to have been committed. The looseness of this requirement is justified on the grounds that
the purpose of the investigation is simply to discover facts. Therefore, requiring specificity
of the Commission's suspicion places an undue burden on the Commission and may frustrate
their fact-finding mission."
3.

The PeriodicPenalty

Hoechst next argued that the Commission's decision to impose a periodic penalty
payment on the business was invalid because the Commission did not first give Hoechst the
opportunity to be heard, nor did it consult the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices
and Dominant Positions."°° The ECI summarily dispensed with this argument, holding that
there was no breach of essential procedural requirements.1"' However, the ECJ did admit
that under article 19(1) of regulation 17 the undertaking must be given the opportunity to be
heard on the matters of the Commission's complaints before a decision is made, including
decisions outlined in article 16 concerning periodic payments. 2
Critical to the ECJ's finding is its recognition that there are two stages to the periodic
penalty.'0 3 The first stage commences the day to day accrual and the second determines
the total amount of the penalty. It was sufficient to the ECI that the Commission conducted
a hearing before fixing the definitive amount of the penalty, whereas no similar procedural
requirement is demanded by the decision to accrue the penalty.' °4 Thus, the ECJ rejected
Hoechst's application for a declaration voiding the Commission's periodic penalty. 5

97.
98.
99.

1d& at para. 39.
1&. at 2930, para. 42.
Hoechst, 1989 E.C.R. at 2929-30, paras. 39-42. Based on article 14(3) the ECJ held that the statement

of reasons shall specify the subject matter and the purpose of the investigation, appoint the date on which it is
to begin, indicate the penalties provided for in articles 15(1)(c) and 16(1)(d), and the existence of the right to
have the decision reviewed by the EC. I&
100. Id. at 2932, para. 54. According to article one of regulation No. 99/63, before consulting the Advisory
Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions, the Commission shall hold a heating pursuant to
article 19(1) of regulation 17. Id. The provisions of article I of regulation No. 99/63 confirm that the hearing
and the consultation of the Advisory Committee are required in the same situations. Ia.
101. Hoechst, 1989 E.C.R. at 2930-31, paras. 44-49.
102. Id. at 2932, para. 51.
103. 1& at pars. 55.
104. Id. at 2933, para. 57.
105. Id. at para. 58.
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IV.

THE ADVOCATE GENERAL's OPINION

The Advocate General is required to offer an impartial opinion to the ECJ prior to its
decision.' While the ECJ is not bound by the Advocate General's opinion, it provides
valuable insight into Community law and is often persuasive."
A.

The Extent of the Commission'sPower

The opinion of the European Court of Justice roughly follows the opinion of Mr.
Advocate General Mischo in this case. However, there are subtle discrepancies in their
views of the Commission's powers. The Advocate General would seemingly allow even
more expansive searches than those conducted and upheld in Hoechst. The Advocate
General argued that the text of article 14 itself suggests that undertakings have a duty to
cooperate in the investigation by furnishing explanations and producing all requested
documents.'0 " Where undertakings comply with their duty by providing the requested
information, no search has taken place.1°9 In defining the scope of the investigation, the
Advocate General acknowledged the Commission's broad power and duty to undertake all
necessary investigations." ° Because of the inherent difficulty in discovering evidence of
article 85 and 86 violations, the Advocate General suggested that Commission officials were
also entitled to look into the manager's briefcases, and even into their diaries to see if they
contain documents or indications relating to business activities.'11
The Advocate General went on to say that the Commission is authorized to see all
documents of an undertaking, even those claimed to be privileged by an attorney-client
relationship.112 As incriminating information is often evasive, searches cannot be narrowly
or specifically construed, and so the expanse of investigations should only be limited by the
Commission's own judgment or ECJ review."13 The Commission's officials must certainly
be given every facility to ensure that no document of relevance escapes their scrutiny. "4
The Advocate General rejected Hoechst's argument that an undertaking's submission
to requests for documents, where the particular nature of the requested document is
unknown, is a search."' However, the Advocate General recognized that the Commission
is powerless to directly enforce the investigation without local help." 6 Local authorities
may only use force ito compel an investigation under the conditions provided by the laws of
their own Member State." 7
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107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

GERHARD BEAR, DEvELOPMENT Op JuDIciAL CONTROL OF THE EuRoPEAN CoMMUNITIES 8-9 (1989).

IdM
Hoechst 1989 E.C.R. at 2878, para. 16 (Adv. Gen. Op.).
Id.
Md-at pama. 1-9.
Id. at 2879, pra 23.
Id. at 2880, para. 27.
Hoechst, 1989 E.R.C. at 2879, para. 24 (Adv. Gen. Op.).
Id. at 2882, para. 36.
Id. at 2896, pam. 124.
Id. at 2895, ram. 117.
Id at 2896, para. 120.
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B. The Right to the Inviolability of the Premise
The Advocate General concluded, from a comparison of National Legislation and ECI
precedent, that the exercise of powers pursuant to regulation 17, even under the threat of a
periodic penalty payment, does not violate the principle of inviolability of the home. The
Advocate General compared the various member states' positions on the extension of the
right to the inviolability of the home to legal entities, and, like the ECJ, noted some
discrepancies, however, the Advocate General discerned a general trend ofMember State's
willingness to assimilate protections of a business premise to that of a home." ' This
finding marks one of the larger distinctions between General Mischo's opinion and that
adopted by the ECL This acknowledgment on a Community level of a fundamental right to
the inviolability ofthe home analogized to an undertaking is not completely novel, however.
The ECJ has previously extended that right to business premises." 9 The Advocate
General's conclusion is nevertheless consistent with the ECJ's as he holds that the exercise
of the Commission's powers under article 14(3) did not violate the fundamental right of
business privacy. 20 While the Advocate General emphasized that the investigation
procedure is premised on cooperation, 1 2 the undertaking's rights were sufficiently
22
safeguarded by its opportunity to contest the Commission's decisions at the EC.
C. The UncertainFuture of Commission Investigations
Lastly, the Advocate General expressed his fear of the ramifications of Hoechst's
example, stating that up until this time the operations of article 14 have been relatively
smooth as most businesses had consented to the investigations. But he predicted that article
14 investigations may prove inoperable if others follow Hoechst's example and proliferate
formal objections within the system."z When faced with a non-consenting business the
Advocate General feared the Commission would lose the advantage of surprise, and its
efforts to discover the elusive evidence would be frustrated. 2 4 The Advocate General
suggested that the Commission officials obtain a search warrant from the local authorities
in advance so that they will be able to conduct an immediate investigation even in the face
of an unwilling host."z However, he recommended that it would be preferable to have the
ECJ issue the necessary warrants instead of the national authorities.'26 Such a procedure
would dispense with the cumbersome interim relief and suspension hearings and would also
streamline the effectiveness of simultaneous inter-state investigations. 27

118. Hoechst, 1989 E.C.R. at 2893, para. 103 (Adv. Gen. Op.).
119. See Case 31/59, Acciaieria e Tubificit di Brescia v. High Authority, 1960 E.C.R. 71, 80 (1960)
(extending the right of privacy to business premises whether those of an individual or a company).
120. Id at 2895, para. 116.
121. Id. at 2895, para. 117.
122. Id. at 2895, at para. 118.
123. Hoechst, 1989 E.C.R. at 2900, para. 144 (Ad. Gen. Op.).
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Id at para. 145.
Id. at para. 146.
Id. at paras. 147-48.
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V. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS

A.

The Hoechst Decision: Friendor Foe of the Undertakings?

Hoechst presented the first opportunity the ECJ had to deal with an undertaking's
attempt to obtain interim relief against a decision ordering it to submit to an
investigation."2 However, it will not be the last time the ECJ is faced with a similar task.
It may be as the Advocate General feared, that undertakings may begin to follow Hoechst's
example by proliferating interim relief proceedings to the EC. Thereby inhibiting the
efficiency of the Commission's investigatory powers.
On the other hamd, this decision may be viewed as a victory for the Commission in its
efforts to enforce articles 85 and 86 in the Community. Hoechstis an example of the
continuing resourcefulness of the Commission and the ECJ in their detection of anticompetitive business behavior. 29 The Commission surely has a strong interest in the
efficient and speedy prosecution of competition proceedings, but this increased vigor by the
Commission will perhaps be met with more and more challenges by undertakings like
Hoechst, who may feel the investigations are infringing on their fundamental rights.
The Hoechstdecision may have its greatest impact upon the ECJ's view of the
fundamental human rights of the citizens of the Member States, which despite their
importance in the world today, have only recently come to play a significant role in
Community law.' Hoechstrepresents an important development in the Community
perspective of human rights law. Indeed, Hoechstis more meaningful for what it refuses to
do rather than what it does. Hoechst refused to extend fundamental rights of inviolability
of the home to undertakings, without presenting a meaningful distinction between the
privacy interests of a person while at work, or while at home. It seems as though the ECJ
is waiting for the European Court of Human Rights to make the first move on this issue."'
Nevertheless, Hoechststruck at least partly in favor of protecting an undertaking's right
to privacy as it required the Commission's compliance with relevant national procedural
safeguards governing searches. 3 2 The importance of this holding is highlighted by the fact
that the Commission did not feel its compliance with these national safeguards was
required.133 While this decision did not affect Hoechst directly, as the Commission had
obtained a warrant, in the future it may provide a significant safeguard for other
undertakings, and substantial fodder for future decisions.
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129.
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Shaw, supra note 65, at 460.
Al
See T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 122 (2d. ed. 1988) (outlining

the relatively recent history of fundamental human rights in the European Community).
131. Hoechst, 1989 E.C.R. at 2924, pars 18.
132. 1d at 2928, pare. 33. It follows from article 14(6) that it is for each Member State to determine the
conditions under which the national authorities will afford assistance to the Commission's officials. IA While
the Member State's disretion in lending aid to officials is somewhat limited, they are entitled to lay down
national laws, within Community boundaries, to ensure respect for undertaking's rights. L
133. Hoechst, 1989 E.C.R. at 2929, para. 37. During the proceedings before the Court, the Commission
argued that its officials are entitled, when making investigations, to carry out searches without the assistance of
the national authorities and without respecting the procedural guarantees provided for under national law. Id.
However, that misinterpretation of article 14 of regulation No. 17 did not render unlawful the decisions adopted
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It may appear that the Commission's duty to adhere to the relevant national procedures
of the Member State involved, results in disproportionate treatment among the Member
States. Placing Community law enforcement, in this respect, contingent on national law,
may therefore prove too unsteady for lasting application. Further, the deference to various
national laws seems to run contrary to the notions of the supremacy as well as uniformity of
Community law. Therefore, the ECJ will probably dispense with this procedure if it has the
effect of frustrating the goals of the Commission in its investigations. Indeed, such a
34
modification would be in line with the historical response of the EC.'
B.

The Effect on FundamentalHuman Rights in Europe

It is interesting to note that the ECJ'srecognition of fundamental human rights has come
primarily at the urging of the Germans. 135 It is no coincidence that the strongest criticism
of the Commission's powers comes from countries whose tradition, like Germany's, is based
on common law. 136 These countries' criticisms derive from a strong feeling of fairness,
legal protection, and legal certainty in public intervention measures. 137 Since the early
days of the Community, German lawyers have had their doubts as to whether Community
law should prevail over the provisions of their German Constitution (Grundgesetz),
especially those areas concerning fundamental human rights. 138 Germany's strong
commitment to fundamental human rights is of course understandable in light of its recent
history. It is equally understandable that German lawyers would expect their constitutional
rights to be recognized
by the ECJ, as all German laws are subordinate to their
139
Constitution.

The Community does not have an enumerated catalog of human rights. 4 ' Rather,
recognition of those fundamental human rights (or natural justice) is inspired by common
philosophies rooted in Member States' legal traditions.
In Nold v. Commission,1 4 1 the ECJheld that in safeguarding fundamental human
rights, it is bound to draw inspiration from constitutional traditions common to the member
states. 142 The Advocate General's opinion in IRCA v. Commission143 suggests that the

134. See generally, PETER OLIVER, FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS INTHE EEC 126-71 (1982). The ECI,
in seeking uniform application of article 36, governing the free movement of goods within the EEC, among the
various Member States, has struck down national legislation that burdened the Community goal enunciated in
that article. l,4 at 127-37. The ECJ has developed a uniform standard of conduct by which to measure the
compliance of Member States in this area. Id. at 127-37. See Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany, 1987 E.C.R.
1227, 1 C.M.L.R. 780 (1987) (striking down national legislation based on alleged consumer protection, in order
to promote the free movement of goods in the Community).
135. See Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419, XX C.M.L.R. 42 (1969) (recognizing a
fundamental right to privacy in social security legislation, where a German refused to give his name and address
on a coupon for butter, claiming it violated his right of privacy).
136. Kreis, supra note 8, at 21.
137. Id.
138. HARTLEY, supra note 130, at 122.
139. Id.
140. See generally A.H. ROBERTSON, PRIvAcY AN HuMAN Rtoirrs (1973) (providing an excellent
description of the early treatment of human rights in the European Community).
141. Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 491, 2 C.M.L.R. 338 (1974) (recognizing that
fundamental human rights are to be protected by the Community and that national laws and traditions may
inspire the Community principles of human rights).
142. Id. at 507, para. 13.
143. Case 7/76, 1976 E.C.R. 1213 (1976).
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ECI will annul any measure that is contrary to the view of human rights espoused by
Germany or any other Member State."' In fact it has been suggested that the ECJ's
protection of fundamental rights is more flexible than any other convention unifying the
Member States would be. 45 This flexibility allows the ECJ to respond to changing
circumstances, evaluate situations, and extend fundamental protections when necessary.' 46
Simply put, the more Member States extending a particular human right to their citizens,
the more likely that right will receive acceptance by the Community. What is likely to be
remembered about the ECJ's refusal to extend fundamental rights to undertakings in
Hoechst,is that there was considerable disagreement among the Member States concerning
the right in question.
Nevertheless, there are other recognized sources from which the ECJ should draw
inspiration when considering embracing a fundamental right. International treaties constitute
an important source for defining what rights are fundamental and will be protected by the
Community. The Community should respect those rights that are treated as fundamental by
treaties to which any Member State is a party or on which they have collaborated.'47
Most importantly in this area is the recognition of rights outlined in the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. As all Member
States are parties, there is little question that it represents the Community view on human
as it is not a state, there is much
rights. 48 Although the Community is not itself a party,
149
discussion as to whether it should be allowed to join.
The aspect of the European Convention of Human Rights that is most pertinent to
HoechstissectionS dealing with theright to privacy. Section 8(1) states "Everyone has the
right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence." While the
5
Court in Hoechsr'50 limited that section to the application of natural persons,1 1
Panasonic52 interpreted this provision as extending fundamental rights of privacy to
undertakings as well.'53 The ECJ in Hoechst ignored the dissimilar finding in Panasonic
and offered no explanation for this apparent departure.
The distinction between an individual's privacy rights in the home and at work is well
settled in tradition as well as in principle. The home has historically, and for good reason,
been more stubbornly protected against public intrusions than has the business world. This
distinction, which i; the underpinning of Hoechst,appears reasonable enough, but may prove
to be problematic. Consider for example a phenomenon that is becoming more common, the
business that is operated out of a home. Should this type of business be treated as a
conventional undertaking, or as a home for purposes of privacy protection against

144. Id. at 1230-3.9 (Adv. Gen. Op.). The Advocate General's reasoning was as follows: Community law
owes its existence to a partial transfer of sovereignty by the Member States to the Community, but since a
Member State cannot be regarded as having included in that transfer the power to legislate contrary to rights
protected by its constitution, it must be assumed that the Community has no power to infringe the rights
embodied in the constitution of any Member State. HARTLEY, supra note 130, at 126 n.17.
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Commission investigations? It is certainly persuasive that one's privacy expectations with
regard to involvement in an undertaking may be less than in the home, but it does not
necessarily follow that the expectation of privacy in the home is lessened because one opts
to run a business from it. Given the characteristically broad interpretations the ECI has
placed on the Commission's powers, even bringing documents54home from work would quite
possibly entitle suspicious investigators to enter the home.'
This concern is strengthened by a history ofinclusive and expansive findings as to what
constitutes an undertaking.'55 It is quite possible for even a single person, whose activities
onlytangentially affect the Community economy, to be considered an undertaking under
article 85, and therefore be subject to the intrusive investigations of the Commission. 156
At some point the deference to the Commission's power, in order to enable them to fulfill
their duties, must be limited so as to give ample respect to the right of privacy of Community
members.
Understandably the right of privacy cannot be absolute if the Community is to be
expected to enforce any ofits provisions. The European Convention of Human Rights itself
recognizes the qualified nature of this right.157 It may be that the public interest in
enforcing articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome justifies the intrusion into an
undertaking's privacy."58 However, it is not difficult to imagine that the broad distinction
drawn by the Hoechstdecision, when coupled with the ambiguity of articles 85 and 86, and
the ECJ's expansive interpretations of the Commission's powers, could lead to unwarranted
or overinvasive infringements on personal privacy rights.
VI. CONCLUSION

At least one author has noted that it might be wise for the ECJ to tread carefully as it
deals with the heightened sensibilities of German litigants and German courts about the
protection of fundamental rights within the Community legal order. 59 While German
lawyers argue for increased respect for their fellow-citizen's constitutional rights in the

154. Treaty of Rome article 14 does not draw a distinction between the privacy interests of the home or
office as it allows officials to enter any premise. Treaty of Rome, supra note I, art. 14.
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156. See RUDOLF GRAUPNER, THE RULEs OF CoMPETrION IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
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distribution of goods or provision of services).
157. Y.B. EuR. CONY. ON H.R. art. 8(2). The European Convention of Human Rights article 8(2) provides
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There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right [of privacy] except
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freedoms of others.
158. See Case 136[79, National Panasonic (UK) Ltd. v. Commission, 1980 E.C.R. 2033,3 C.M.L.R. 169
(1980) (holding that while fundamental rights of privacy apply to an undertaking, such rights are overridden by
the legitimate public interest of enforcing anti-competition laws).
159. Shaw, supra note 65, at 460.
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Community forum, Germany itself has been notably supportive of its role as defined in the
Treaty of Rome. The Germans offered a strong vote of confidence in favor of the EEC's
authority when the German Federal Constitutional Court accepted the Community legal
order as capable of providing adequate legal protection for fundamental rights without the
need for intervention. 6 ' It remains to be seen whether the Community's courts will
demonstrate that such confidence is deserved.
At the outset it seemed that Hoechst's case had very little chance of success. The
Commission followed the investigation procedures outlined by the Treaty of Rome. The
very basis upon which enforcement of the Community's competition laws would have called
into question if Hoechst's rights had been found to have been infringed. Such a finding
would have substantially compromised the Commission in fulfilling its duties in this area,
and put businesses at a considerable advantage in concealing incriminating evidence.
Nevertheless, there is still a strong and growing concern that businesses under
community law are insufficiently safeguarded against Commission investigations. And
Hoechst will, if anything, increase those concerns. The requirement of respect for the
relevant national procedural safeguards will likely be disregarded by the Court if it frustrates
the effectiveness of the Commission. The dilemma of the small business run out of the
home, along with numerous other individuals who fit into the expansive definition of
undertaking under articles 85 and 86, who now enjoy less protection from intrusive
Commission procedures, suggests that the Community should re-evaluate its balancing of
interests.
If the Court seeks to look beyond the discrepancies among the protections afforded by
the various Member States, and extends uniform Community protection, it seems to be free
to adopt a model offering any level of protection. Further, the Court could streamline
safeguards, preserving the element of surprise, by issuing warrants itself in place of the
national authorities, thereby dispensing entirely with interim hearings. Such action would
presumably increase the efficiency of the Commission's detection of article 85 and 86
violations, but it would cause increased concern and dissatisfaction among member states
like Germany with strong common law constitutions. It would also perpetuate the
arbitrariness of extending increased privacy rights to some individuals and not to others,
without distinguising between their expectations on a reasonable basis. Unfortunately this
is the road most often traveled by the ECI, as its extension of uniformity fails to adopt the
more protective systems.
A better response would involve a strengthening rather than weakening of the
safeguards. Cornraunity law should extend its recognition of those fundamental rights
embraced by even the most protective Member State's constitution, thereby limiting the
breadth of the Hoechst ruling. Membership in the Community should not come at the
expense of the vital principles of a Member State's constitution. Rather, it is time for the
Community law to ive up to the trust placed in it by Germany and other states by adequately
protecting their rights.
ChristianB. Green
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